What are the sources of vertical tax externalities? The empirical aspects of vertical common pool issues have been studied extensively in the literature; however, very little attention, if any, has been given to studying their sources. In this paper we point at a new determinant: Corporate federal tax shocks. Adopting the case of the U.S., and using narrative-based tax shocks (Romer and Romer 2010), we study the separate vertical effects of corporate and non-corporate federal tax shocks. We find that vertical tax externalities work exclusively through the former. In particular, we estimate that a 1 billion dollar increase in federal corporate tax revenues reduce states' corporate tax revenues by approximately 20 million dollars; non-corporate federal tax shocks, on the other hand, do not seem to affect state tax revenues. Taking a state micro-level approach and using firm-level business activity data we show this distinction is a result of the erosion of states' corporate tax bases.
I. Introduction
The rivalry between the federal level and the state level over the same tax base, also known as vertical tax externality, or vertical tax competition, is a relatively new topic in the fiscal federalism literature. Most theoretical and empirical studies focus on vertical tax competition and provide conflicting results regarding the effects of chnagers in federal tax rates on state tax rates. We focus on the vertical tax externality, namely the effect of federal tax shocks on state tax revenues. We disaggregate the effect of federal tax shocks to corporate and non-corporate taxes, using the methodology proposed by Romer and Romer (2010) (henceforth RR) , and find that federal corporate tax shocks drive vertical tax externalities.
We find that federal tax shocks decrease state corporate tax revenues, while they hardly affect non-corporate state tax revenues. A one billion dollar increase in federal tax revenues leads to a 16.5 million dollars decrease in total state corporate tax revenues. We also demonstrate that the decrease in tax revenue is a result of a smaller tax base by showing a negative association between federal tax shocks and the number of firms and establishments operating in the state, as well as an adverse effect on labor market outcomes like unemployment and household income. Federal tax shocks do not seem to significantly affect state corporate tax rates.
Our paper provides a novel identification strategy, based on narrative federal tax shocks (Romer and Romer 2010) , which are used to identify the effect of federal tax shocks on state tax revenues. While parts of the literature ignore simultaneity and endogeneity issues in tax setting, we focus on a plausibly exogenous component of federal tax changes. The difficulty in identifying exogenous changes to the tax code might be one of the reasons for the disagreement in the literature regarding the magnitude, and even the sign of the effect of federal taxes on state taxes. Keen (1998) was probably the first to present a complete model of vertical tax externalities. He showed that if the federal and state levels share the same tax base, an increase in federal tax rates might erode the state tax base. In the case of unit taxes and log convexity of demand, a smaller tax base decreases state tax revenues, creating a negative vertical tax externality. Dahlby and Wilson (2003) provide a similar model, giving potentially opposite results. They show that in the case of ad-valorem taxes (as opposed to unit taxes) and inelastic demand, the vertical tax externality will be positive.
II. Literature review
To understand the applicability of these models to the case of the US states, note that the main taxes which finance state budgets are income, corporate and sales taxes.
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Most of these taxes are ad-valorem, hence the model of Dahlby and Wilson (2003) is more appropriate. Therefore, the sign of the vertical tax externality depends on the elasticity of demand. The demand for labor, capital and most consumer goods is probably elastic (see Murphy and Welch 1992, Borjas 2003 regarding labor demand; Papke 1991, Serrato and Zidar 2014 regarding capital; and Tellis 1988 regarding consumer goods). In other words, we would expect federal tax hikes to reduce state tax revenues due to a negative vertical tax externality.
Having a vertical tax externality requires that when setting federal (state) tax rates, the adverse effects of these taxes on the tax base of the state (federal) level is not taken into account. However, vertical tax externalities (as well as horizontal tax externalities) can be corrected by the federal government through transfers (Dahlby 1996 , Boadway and Keen 1996 , Boadway et al. 1998 , Hoyt 2001 , or even taxes, if the 1 While the empirical literature provides evidence on cigarette tax and fuel tax, we do not include them in the analysis since their contribution to state tax revenue is minute. Property taxes are usually levied at the local level which is beyond the scope of this paper. federal government takes into account the effect of its tax changes on state tax revenues (Hoyt 2001 Hayashi and Boadway (2001) find that provincial tax rates respond negatively to federal tax rates, in Canada.
The literature on vertical tax competition mainly deals with non-corporate state taxes and does not reach a unanimous conclusion regarding the sign and magnitude of vertical tax competition. First, dealing with excise taxes, some suggest that an increase in the federal tax rate on cigarettes and gasoline leads to an increase in state tax rates on these items (Besley and Rosen 1998, Devereux et al. 2007 ). However, others suggest that state cigarette tax rates decline when federal cigarette tax rates increase (Fredriksson and Mamun 2008) . The results regarding gasoline taxes are also mixed: state gasoline tax revenues are adversely affected by past increases in federal gasoline tax rates, but positively affected by current tax rates ). The divergence in this literature stems from different samples as well as different specifications, and is hard to settle without additional findings.
The empirical literature also deals with income taxes. Esteller-More and SolleOlle (2001) find that state income tax rates are positively correlated with federal income tax rates. A related paper finds virtually the same result for Canada (Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé 2002) . However, Goodspeed (2000) suggests that an increase in federal tax rates decreases state tax rates, in the US. Therefore, the literature seems to suggest no conclusive result regarding vertical tax competition in income taxes.
Vertical tax competition might also prevail at the sub-national level. For example, Brett and Pinkse (2000) find that municipal business property tax rates are negatively correlated with provincial tax rates in Canada. Agrawal (2015a) finds similar results for the US. Burge and Rogers (2011) show that county tax rates negatively affect municipal tax revenues. Revelli (2003) estimates sub national vertical fiscal externalities from the spending side. He finds that an increase in county spending from own sources (which he calls a tax burden, since this spending has to be financed from county taxes) reduces district spending in the UK. These result suggest that local governments might be trying to internalize the vertical tax externality, therefore reducing local tax rates.
The literature on vertical tax externalities is also related to the literature on fiscal and tax multiplier. An increase in federal tax rates can have an indirect effect on state tax revenues (and hence on state tax rates) due to the tax multiplier and its effect on state tax bases. For example, an increase in federal tax rates would have a contracting effect on the economy Romer 2010, Mertens and Ravn 2014 Fossen and Steiner (2014) find an adverse effect of corporate taxes on business activity at the municipal level. Ravn (2013, 2014) provide a macro-level analysis and show the effect of corporate and non-corporate tax shocks on economic activity.
Lastly, an issue related to the vertical tax externality is the horizontal tax externality: a possible negative effect of state tax rates on tax revenues in other states.
While this effect has theoretical foundations (Bucovetsky 1991, Kanbur and Keen 1993) , the empirical literature mainly deals with horizontal tax competition at the local level and is highly divided. Some suggest that horizontal tax competition exists (Büttner 2003 , Heyndels and Vuchelen 1998 , Feld and Kirchgässner 2001 , Agrawal 2015b ), while others offer opposing results (Lyytikäinen 2012 , Baskaran 2014 , Isen 2014 . explore state excise taxes and do find evidence for horizontal tax competition.
II. Data
Following RR, we define changes to the federal tax code as exogenous or endogenous federal tax shocks (more details are given in Section III, see also Romer and Romer 2010) . We aggregate the RR tax shocks from the quarterly to the annual frequency and use only the exogenous tax shocks, which are -2.29 billion dollars per year on average (Table 1) . Federal tax shocks range from a tax decrease of 126.4 billion dollars to a tax hike of 68.1 billion dollar. These tax shocks are the projected changes in federal tax revenues as a result of the changes in the tax code.
In order to understand the effect of different federal taxes, we separate the RR tax shocks to corporate and non-corporate taxes, based on the detailed description of each change to the tax code provided by Romer and Romer (2009 We collected data on state tax revenues from the US Census survey: State Government Tax Collections, which limits our sample period to . We look at total tax revenues and also at their division to corporate taxes and non-corporate taxes. 4 We also control for Gross State Product (GSP), taken from the BEA. We also collected data on business activity from the Business Dynamics Statistics. Finally, we collected data on employment and earnings from the IPUMS-CPS dataset (King et al. 2010 ). We aggregated this dataset to the state level using the weights provided in the dataset.
Descriptive statistics for the main variables is given in Appendix Table A1 , and a complete list of our data sources is provided in Appendix Table A2 .
III. Methodology
their effect on state tax revenue, as well as other state level data. 5 Following RR, a distinction is made between "exogenous" tax changes and "endogenous" ones.
"Exogenous" tax changes are defined as tax changes that were not designed to offset other (short-term) macroeconomic shocks. In other words, exogenous tax changes had motivations which were not related to immediate economic fluctuations, but rather were based on long run considerations and ideological or philosophical considerations. RR assess the magnitude of the tax shock based on projections done by the CBO and other government agencies. A more complete description of their methodology is provided in Romer and Romer (2009) and Romer and Romer (2010) .
We start the analysis with equation 1, which is a variant of equation 5 in Romer and Romer (2010):
Where ∆ is the first difference of log state tax revenues in time t, is an exogenous tax changes in time t and is the residual. The only difference between equation 1 here and equation 5 in RR is that we explore the effect of federal tax shocks on tax revenues whereas RR estimate their effect on GDP. While RR use a quarterly time series for the US, we use a yearly panel data of 50 states for the period 1963-2007. 6 This difference leads to several changes to the specification, as is evident in Equation (2):
Other papers which use the Romer & Romer methodology to study state level activity include Zidar (2015) , Hayo and Uhl (2015) and Perez-Sebastian et al. (2015) . These papers are mainly dedicated to exploring heterogeneous effects of the RR tax shocks.
Where ∆ is the first difference of log state tax revenues per capita in state i at time t, is the federal tax shock in year t, represents the spatial component and is the log of the weighted average of neighboring states' tax revenue. 8 We control for spatial effects due to the possibility of horizontal tax competition. is a vector of control variables which includes gross state product per capita and a time trend. is state fixed effects and ν is the residual. We follow RR and use lags to allow for continuous effects. We use 3 yearly lags which is consistent with Romer and Romer (2010) who use 12 quarterly lags.
Our specification is done using the fixed-effects estimator, since we assume that the narrative tax changes are exogenous to economic activity and to state tax revenues.
GSP is added in order to control for economic fluctuations and spatial effects are added to conform with the literature, which is sometimes analyzing vertical and horizontal tax externalities simultaneously. Unfortunately, since federal tax shocks are the same for all states in a specific year, we cannot use year fixed-effects, hence we use a time trend.
In the robustness checks we introduce quinquennial fixed effects (i.e. dummy variables for every 5-year period). Table 1 presents the results of estimating equation 2, with three lags of federal tax shocks as the main explanatory variables. Following RR, we focus on the accumulated effect of federal tax shocks, while discussing the effect of specific lags when necessary.
IV. Results
Column 1 displays the effect of federal tax shocks on total state tax revenues. While the third lag is marginally statistically significant, the accumulated effect, which is negative and equal to -0.00005, is not statistically significant at the 5% level. shocks on firm level activity suggests that a reduction in the tax base is the reason for lower state tax revenues.
In Table 4 we further explore the effect of federal tax shocks on firm-level activity, trying to understand which firms are affected the most. Therefore, we divide establishments to small and large, where establishments with less than 10 workers are considered small, and those with 10 workers or more are considered medium or large.
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Column 1 displays the effect of federal tax shocks on small establishments, and we can see a negative effect with similar magnitude to those reported in Table 3 . However, large establishments are hardly affected by federal tax shocks (column 2). We therefore conclude that federal tax shocks affect small businesses much more than they affect large ones.
b.4. Household sector effects of federal tax shocks
A final step in our analysis is to explore the effect of federal tax shocks on households.
Following our prior findings, we would expect households to have lower income levels and to have higher unemployment levels due to the reduction in business activity. We use the IPUMS-CPS dataset which includes household-level surveys of the entire US.
We focus on the following variables: unemployment, hours worked, wage income and household income. The last variable, household income, is at the household level, while the others are at the respondent level. We aggregate the data to the state level using the weights provided in the survey, and compute state-level averages of the aforementioned variables. Table 5 presents the effect of federal tax shocks on labor market outcomes and household income. First, column 1 presents the effect of federal tax shocks on unemployment. We can see that unemployment rises in the two years after a federal tax hike, though the accumulated effect is not statistically significant. In terms of magnitude, the coefficient for the second lag, which is statistically significant, equals 0.00002, while the accumulated effect equals 0.00001. Both coefficients are small in terms of economic magnitude, suggesting that a 1 billion dollars increase in federal taxes would lead to an increase of 0.00002 (or 0.00001) percentage points in unemployment levels.
Column 2 tests the effect of federal tax shocks on hours worked. The results suggest an increase in hours worked, by 0.00099, though this effect is only marginally statistically significant. Judging from columns 1 and 2, it seems like federal tax shocks push workers out of employment, with remaining workers somewhat compensate the loss of workers by working more hours.
Columns 3 and 4 (Table 5 ) examine the effect of federal tax shocks on wages and income. First, we can see that wage income tends to increase after a federal tax shock, at least in the second lag, though the accumulated effect is not statistically significant. This positive association might be a result of at least two things. First, as shown in column 2, hours worked tend to rise after a federal tax shock. Second, since unemployment is rising, the composition of remaining workers might change. If unemployment is concentrated in low-income workers, then average wage would increase. In order to better understand what happened to the actual income of households, we examine the effect of federal tax shocks on household income (column 4). Here we see a decrease in income levels, equals to -0.00006, which is roughly $4 per household.
Summing up the effects of federal tax shocks on labor market outcomes, we can observe an increase in unemployment, an increase in hours worked, and a possible increase in average wage. Household income at the state level, however, decreases after a federal tax shock. (column 1), and up to the fourth year (column 2). The accumulated effect of federal tax shocks increases when more lags are added to the analysis.
b.5. Robustness checks
Column 3 of Table 6 explores whether the results are sensitive to the estimation strategy. Specifically, column 3 uses a dynamic panel-data model which is estimated using GMM (Arellano and Bond 1991). Nickel (1981) showed that using fixed effects models to estimate short panels with lagged dependent variables might yield biased estimates. Since our panel is relatively long, we use the Arellano Bond estimator only as a robustness check. Looking at the results of column 3 we can see that the accumulated effect of federal tax shocks, which is equal to -0.00132, is statistically significant, and is actually larger than that of the baseline specification.
Column 4 of Table 6 adds quinquennial (5-year) dummies to the specification.
These dummies take the value of one for every 5-year period, starting 1960, onward (and zero otherwise). The 5-year dummies are serving as year (or more exactly 5-year) fixed effects, and are used since we cannot use year fixed effects. The results of Column estimate.
Column 5 of Table 6 uses an alternative measure for federal tax shocks -total federal corporate tax revenues, taken from the BEA, instead of the narrative measure of Romer and Romer (2010) . While federal corporate tax revenues are possibly endogenous to state corporate tax revenues, it is interesting to examine the direction of the bias which is caused by using endogenous tax data. The results of Column 5 are fairly consistent with our baseline results, showing a negative effect in the second and third lags, but a positive effect in the first lag. While the magnitudes of these effects is large comparted with our baseline results, the accumulated effect is smaller in magnitude and is not statistically significant. It looks like endogenous federal tax shocks show a larger association with state tax revenues, but that much of this association can be attributed to yearly macroeconomic fluctuations, which wash away in the long run.
Finally, Column 6 of Table 6 introduces another control variable to the baseline specification -federal transfers. An increase in federal transfers will increase state revenues, and therefore might lead to lower tax revenues, for example by creating an incentive to lower tax rates. However, adding federal transfers as a control variable hardly affects the results, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
V. Conclusions
This paper provides evidence on the magnitude of vertical tax externalities -the influence of federal tax shocks on state tax revenues. Our estimates suggest that a 1 billion dollar increase in federal taxes leads to a decrease of 19 million dollars in state corporate tax revenues. We further explore the effect of federal tax shocks by looking on business activity and labor market outcomes. We show that federal tax shocks reduce firms' activity and lead to unemployment and reductions in total household income.
The results suggest that corporate taxes drive vertical tax externalities: state corporate tax revenues diminish when federal corporate taxes rise. A possible solution to this loss in revenue would be to increase tax rates or cut state spending. Another solution would include federal transfers to the states that would compensate for the loss in state tax revenue. , and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. All regressions estimate equation 2, i.e. they include as independent variables the log of real GSP per capita, spatial effects, state fixed effects and a time trend. `Federal tax shocks' are the narrative-based exogenous federal tax shocks taken from Romer and Romer (2010) . For further information on variables see data Appendix. , and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. All regressions estimate equation 2, i.e. they include as independent variables the log of real GSP per capita, spatial effects, state fixed effects and a time trend. `Federal tax shocks' are the narrative-based exogenous federal tax shocks taken from Romer and Romer (2010). Note: Standard errors are robust, clustered by state, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. `Federal tax shocks' are the narrative-based exogenous federal tax shocks taken from Romer and Romer (2010) . All regressions estimate equation 2, i.e. they include as independent variables the log of real GSP per capita, spatial effects, state fixed effects and a time trend. , and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. All regressions estimate equation 2, i.e. they include as independent variables the log of real GSP per capita, spatial effects, state fixed effects and a time trend. `Federal tax shocks' are the narrativebased exogenous federal tax shocks taken from Romer and Romer (2010) . , and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. All regressions estimate equation 2, i.e. they include as independent variables the log of real GSP per capita, spatial effects, state fixed effects and a time trend. `Federal tax shocks' are the narrative-based exogenous federal tax shocks taken from Romer and Romer (2010) . The dependent variable in columns 1 through 5 is log state corporate tax revenues per capita. The dependent variable in Column 6 is log investment per capita. Standard errors are robust, clustered by state, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. All regressions include state fixed effects. `Federal tax shocks' are the narrative-based exogenous federal tax shocks taken from Romer and Romer (2010) . 'GSP per capita' is the log of real Gross State Product divided by state population. Columns 1 and 2 include two and four lags of the main independent variable, respectively. Column 3 uses the Arellano-Bond estimator. Column 4 introduces 5-year dummy variables to the baseline specification. Column 5 uses total federal tax revenues as the independent variable instead of the RR narrative measure. Column 6 controls for federal transfers. 
